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Abstract
In order to fight collusive behaviors, the best scenario for competition authorities would
be the possibility to analyze detailed information on firms’ costs and prices, being the
price-cost margin a robust indicator of market power. However, information on firms’
costs is rarely available. In this context, a fascinating technique to detect data manipula-
tion and rigged prices is offered by an odd phenomenon called Benford’s Law, otherwise
known as First-Digit Law, which has been successfully employed to discover the “Libor
Scandal” much time before the opening of the cartel settlement procedure. Thus, the
main objective of the present paper is to apply a such useful instrument to track the
price of the aluminium traded on the London Metal Exchange, following the allegations
according to which there would be an aluminium cartel behind. As a result, quick tests
such as Benford’s Law can only be helpful to inspect markets where price patterns show
signs of collusion. Given the budget constraints to which antitrust watchdogs are com-
monly subject to, a such price screen could be set up, just exploiting the data available,
as warning system to identify cases that require further investigations.
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In Francia abbiamo seguito le vostre elezioni.
Il capo del governo ha tre reti televisive?
S`ı.
Perche´ in Francia non si potrebbe, c’e` una legge.
Voi non avete la legge antitrust?
S`ı. S`ı e no. Piu` no che s`ı.
Nanni Moretti
1 Libor Scandal
In 2013, the European Commission imposed an administrative fine of 1.7 billion
euro to some of the world’s largest banking companies involved in what has been
described by the mass media as “Libor Scandal”1. The record sanction, being the
highest ever levied by the officials of Brussels for a cartel infringement, was issued to
8 international financial institutions for participating in illegal agreements relating
to interest rate derivatives. As it is common knowledge, interest rate derivatives
are financial products, such as futures, options, swaps, which are both employed as
insurance tools for managing the risk of interest rate fluctuations and traded world-
wide as investment assets by financial intermediaries. The value of these financial
derivatives comes from the level of a benchmark interest rate, such as the Euro
Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor), which is used for the euro area, or the London
Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), which is used for several currencies including the
Japanese Yen. In turn, the value of these benchmarks reflects the averaged interest
rate at which, respectively, a selected panel of Eurozone and London banks offer to
lend funds in a given currency to other banks on the daily interbank market.
In a nutshell, the cartel aimed at manipulating the pricing process of the Euribor
and the Libor, distorting the competition in the underlying trading of interest rate
derivatives. Since at least $800 trillion in derivatives, loans, securities and other
financial products are tied to the Euribor and the Libor, such was the dimension of
the scandal, which inter alia has highlighted the urgency of a regulatory reform of
the banking sector, the largest one to have been rigged so far.
1Commission Decision of 4 December 2013, Euro Interest Rate Derivatives, Case AT.39914;
Commission Decision of 4 December 2013, Yen Interest Rate Derivatives, Case AT.39861; European
Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines banks ¿ 1.71 billion for participating in cartels in the
interest rate derivatives industry, Press Release, IP/13/1208, 4 December 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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2 Benford’s Law
A crucial expedient for revealing the “Libor Scandal” has been the leniency pro-
gram, joined by a member of the cartel at issue providing an active cooperation
in the investigation of the Commission in exchange of full immunity. Beyond the
success of the cartel settlement procedure and the relevant dimension of the market
involved, from a competition policy standpoint, the Libor case offers another inter-
esting food for thought, being an excellent example of how antitrust authorities can
employ screening instruments to identify collusive behaviors.
A fascinating technique to detect rigged prices is offered by an odd phenomenon
called Benford’s Law, otherwise known as First-Digit Law. Although a primordial
statement must be attributed to Newcomb (1881)2, in a 1938 paper, the father of
the law, a physicist working at General Electric, recognized the existence of a spe-
cific pattern that often occurs in vast datasets3. In particular, the law consists in a
frequency distribution which describes the probability according to which a number
present in a random dataset starts with a certain digit.
Theoretically, if a set of numbers were truly random, each leading digit would
appear about 11% of the time. On the contrary, Benford’s Law predicts a logarithmic
weakly monotonic distribution, according to which the digit 1 occurs as leading
digit about 30% of the time, while larger digits occur in that position less and less
frequently (cf. Formula 1). In other terms, the leading digits are not distributed
evenly, as it would be natural to expect, but following a distribution where 1 is the
most frequent and 9 is the less common. The law, which has also been generalized to
digits beyond the first, tends to be more precise in datasets which exhibit multiple
orders of magnitude and for types of values which grow exponentially.
Formula 1 - Benford’s Law Logarithmic Probability Distribution Function
P (d) = log10(d + 1) - log10(d) = log10 (
d+1
d ) = log10 (1 +
1
d )
2Newcomb, S. (1881), Note on the Frequency of Use of the Different Digits in Natural Numbers,
American Journal of Mathematics, Vol. 4, No. 1, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
United States, pp. 39-40.
3Benford, F. (1938), The Law of Anomalous Numbers, Proceedings of the American Philosoph-
ical Society, Vol. 78, No. 4, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, United States, pp.
551-572.
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A brief and intuitive explanation of why the law naturally occurs is that usually
we start counting from the digit 1 until the digit 9. It is obvious that if we think to
the digits from 1 to 9, we have the same probability that a random number starts
with any of these digits. But if we consider a range of numbers, for example from
1 to 20, we count more numbers starting with the digit 1. The same happens if
we consider the range of numbers from 1 to 30, where we count many numbers
starting with the digit 1, but also many others starting with the digit 2. In any
case, what matters is that, in order to have many numbers starting with the digit
9, it is necessary to examine a large dataset. As a result, analyzing for instance
distributions of numbers related to populations or surfaces, the probability to have
a number starting with the digit 1 will be higher than that to have a number with
9 as leading digit. Accordingly, Benford showed that, for several types of distribu-
tions, the probability that a number starts with a certain digit tends to be always
the same (cf. Figure 1).
Figure 1 - Probability Distribution of Leading Digits according to Benford’s Law
3 Literature Review
The predictive power of Benford’s Law has been ascertained valid in several situ-
ations normally observable in the real world. Death rates, election votes, financial
transitions, government spendings, income distributions, physical and mathematical
constants, population numbers and stock prices are just few examples over which
3
the law applies. It is not a case that auditors have successfully employed it to detect
frauds and manipulations in accounting data since the 1970s. At that time also
Varian (1972)4 suggested the possibility to use the law to uncover falsifications in
socio-economic data collected for public purposes, under the assumption that who
aims at rigging datasets tends to provide numbers distributed according to a uniform
pattern. Nigrini (1999)5 as well showed that the law can be exploited for taxation
controls, after having tested it with success on real cases of fiscal scams.
Thus, given its regularity, the law can be adopted to test economic data in several
cases. It’s application is rather straightforward: even though a dataset has been ar-
tificially ordered in such a way to preserve randomness, the distribution of the digits
will definitely violate the pattern predicted by the law. Within the present frame-
work, in a seminal paper by Abrantes-Metz et al. (2011)6, the authors considered
worthwhile to test the theory over Libor data, using the second digit distribution
variant of the law. The surprising result was that the benchmark interest rate at
issue departed significantly from the Benford’s Law pattern over an extended period
of time, signaling the possibility of a rate manipulation. As a result, through a quick
application of the test, the Libor cartel could have been discovered much time before
the opening of the settlement procedure.
In Bra¨hler et al. (2011)7, a Benford’s Law test was applied to investigate the
quality of macroeconomic data reported by the EU member states to Eurostat in
order to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact criteria. Since government
statistics are comparable in nature to financial accounting, governments, like firms
towards auditors, might be tempted to adjust the national account balances, given
the strict obligations to which are subject to. The authors of the study found that
the official statistics submitted by Greece registred the greatest deviation from the
expected Benford’s Law distribution in comparison to all the other EU countries.
4Varian, H.R. (1972), Benford’s Law (Letters to the Editor), The American Statistician, Vol.
26, Issue 3, Taylor & Francis Journals, London, United Kingdom, pp. 62-65.
5Nigrini, M.J. (1999), I’ve Got Your Number: How a Mathematical Phenomenon Can Help
CPAs Uncover Fraud and Other Irregularities, Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 187, Issue 5, American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, New York, United States, pp. 15-27.
6Abrantes-Metz, R.M., Judge, G., Villas-Boas, S. (2011), Tracking the Libor Rate, Applied
Economics Letters, Vol. 10, Issue 10, Taylor & Francis Journals, London, United Kingdom, pp.
893-899.
7Bra¨hler, G., Engel, S., Go¨ttsche, M., Rauch, B. (2011), Fact and Fiction in EU-Governmental
Economic Data, German Economic Review, Vol. 12, Issue 3, John Wiley & Sons, New York,
United States, pp. 243-255.
4
The manipulation of financial data by the Greek institutions has officially been cer-
tified by the Commission at a later stage.
4 Empirical Analysis of the London Metal Ex-
change
As well as for the “Libor Scandal”, the Wall Street Journal has launched in 2011
an investigation about possible anti-competitive practices on the London Metal Ex-
change (LME), allegedly resulting in artificially high prices for a category of com-
modities, above all aluminium, whose hoarding is managed by a group of interna-
tional banking corporations8. In the last years, in fact, the metals industry has
been invested by a huge wave of acquisitions by major investment banks of metals
warehouses located around the world. According to the allegations, the “too big
to fail banks” at issue, being owners of large aluminium warehouses able to hoard
massive supply in excess, despite the record levels of production registred since 2011,
would have deliberately delayed the market distribution of aluminium products, in-
flating so its final price and gathering in the meantime exorbitant rents and other
fees for the storage operations (cf. Figure 2). As a matter of fact, aluminium is the
only commodity for which prompt delivery is not guaranteed, requiring instead its
distribution several months. In the past, an analogous supply bottleneck strategy
was used by De Beers to obstruct the market clearing and to maintain the price of
diamonds extremely high.
The group of bank holding companies owners of the aluminium warehouses has
replied to the allegations asserting that it merely follows the guidelines established
by the LME (although, it is worth to notice, the investment banks in question are
members and shareholders of the LME itself). However, in the United States, three
class-action lawsuits were filed in 2013 against the alleged aluminium cartel for its
presumed control over the LME. According to the plaintiffs, 5 billion dollars has been
the total cost of the cartel at the expense of consumers for the period 2011-2013.9
8Hotter, A., Shumsky. T. (2011), Wall Street Gets Eyed in Metal Squeeze. Some Say Ware-
housing Inflates Prices, The Wall Street Journal, 17 June 2001, New York, United States.
9Master Screens Inc., et al. v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., et al., Case No. 13-CV-00431,
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division; Superior
Extrusion Inc., et al. v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., et al., Case No. 13-CV-13315, United States
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Figure 2 - LME Aluminium Price (US$ per Tonne) (2002-2013)
As a result, the main objective of the present paper is to apply Benford’s Law
to track the daily LME aluminium price over the period 2011-2013, in order to
verify possible data manipulations which would suggest the existence of a cartel.
We analyze this time period for two basic reasons: firstly, because after the col-
lapse of aluminum prices due to the global financial crisis, 2011 is the year when
the commodity at issue began to reach very high prices, apparently not justified by
the record levels of production touched; secondly, because the suspect of a possible
collusion started to be felt at that time.
For what concerns the application of Benford’s Law, since the nominal value of
the aluminium price does not change very much over short periods of time, an anal-
ysis of the first digit distribution would be meaningless since the pattern predicted
by the law would be definitely violated. On the contrary, in Table 2 and 3, as well as
in Figure 3 and Figure 4, we can observe how the empirical second digit distribution
and in particular the empirical third digit distribution of the LME aluminium price
for the period 2002-2013 follow the expected pattern. This confirms the fact that
the price spans the nine digit space only if we consider the second and the third digit.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Detroit Division; River Parish Contractors
Inc., et al. v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., et al., Case No. 13-CV-05267, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Division.
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Table 1 - Bendord’s Law Second Digit Test: LME Aluminium (US$ per Tonne) (2002-2013)
Digit LME Frequency Benford Rate LME Rate ∆
0 226 11.97% 7.48% -4.49%
1 157 11.39% 5.20% -6.19%
2 191 10.82% 6.32% -4.50%
3 447 10.43% 14.80% 4.36%
4 445 10.03% 14.73% 4.70%
5 209 9.67% 6.92% -2.75%
6 239 9.34% 7.91% -1.43%
7 377 9.04% 12.48% 3.44%
8 451 8.76% 14.93% 6.17%
9 2 8.50% 9.24% 0.74%
Total 3,021
Table 2 - Bendord’s Law Third Digit Test: LME Aluminium (US$ per Tonne) (2002-2013)10
Digit LME Frequency Benford Rate LME Rate ∆
0 338 11.97% 11.19% -0.78%
1 298 11.39% 9.86% -1.52%
2 294 10.82% 9.73% -1.09%
3 333 10.43% 11.02% 0.59%
4 313 10.03% 10.36% 0.33%
5 269 9.67% 8.90% -0.76%
6 291 9.34% 9.63% 0.30%
7 312 9.04% 10.33% 1.29%
8 285 8.76% 9.43% 0.68%
9 288 8.50% 9.53% 1.03%
Total 3,021
10In Table 2, Benfor’s Law second digit rates, rather than third digit ones, are reported since,
for the sake of simplicity of computations, we deleted first digits from the entire dataset when we
dealt with the third digit distribution. Thus, we can treat third digits as they were second digits.
Of course, this expedient does not alter the value of Benford’s Law analysis. Furthermore, this
allow us to better and equally compare the two LME Aluminium sets of rates, reported in Table
1 and Table 2, respect to Benford’s Law one.
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Figure 3 - Bendord’s Law Second Digit Test: LME Aluminium (US$ per Tonne) (2002-2013)
Figure 4 - Bendord’s Law Third Digit Test: LME Aluminium (US$ per Tonne) (2002-2013)
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Since our main concern is with the aluminium price trend registred in the last
3 years, following the methodology adopted to detect the “Libor Scandal”, we now
proceed to test the closeness to the Benford’s Law pattern of the empirical distri-
butions of both the second and third digits of the daily LME aluminium price. Our
assessment is based on rolling six month periods, starting from 2011 until 2013.
In particular, in Table 3, we present the empirical frequencies of the second digit
distribution, whilst in Table 4 we present the empirical frequencies of the third digit
distribution. The two tables at issue, given the size, are reported at the end of the
current work.
Two are the main results. As for the second digit distribution, we register empir-
ical frequencies which depart significantly from the expected Benford’s Law pattern.
This raises potential concerns relative to the data integrity of the aluminium price.
Only the empirical frequencies of the third digit distribution, which we decided to
compute for a more conservative analysis, are in line with the pattern predicted by
the law. In this regard, it is important to remind that for the Libor cartel, it was
enough to find departures similar to those we found in the empirical second digit
distribution of the LME aluminium price to raise alert about possible rigged prices.
Furthermore, in the Libor case, several periods of time where Benford’s Law was
respected were found in any case. Here, instead, at least for the period 2011-2013,
the deviation from the expected pattern is costant. Moreover, the deviation of both
the second and third digit distributions from the Benford’s Law pattern tends to
increase over time, reaching the maximum levels in 2013. The opening of an inves-
tigation to further examine the aluminium industry, according to the price screen
at issue, seems therefore worthwhile.
5 Policy Conclusions
In order to detect and fight cartel conducts, the best scenario for competition agen-
cies would be of course the possibility to analyze detailed information on firms’ costs
and prices, being the price-cost margin a robust indicator of market power. How-
ever, information on firms’ costs is rarely available. In this context, as pointed out
by our analysis of the London Metal Exchange, quick tests such as Benford’s Law
can only be helpful to inspect markets where price patterns show signs of collusion.
Given the budget constraints to which antitrust watchdogs are commonly subject
to, a such price screen could be set up, just exploiting the data available, as warning
system to identify cases that require the opening of an investigation.
9
Nevertheless, it is important to underline that Benford’s Law, as any other sta-
tistical test, cannot be adopted as investigative tool in any circumstance, since not
all real data are expected to obey the law at issue. The risk otherwise is to fall into
false-positive assessments. In any case, what seems certain is the fact that such a
useful instrument, if not employed by competition authorities, will be surely used
by firms to further disguise and mystify cartel activities.
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